Despite the frequency of stillbirths, the subsequent implications are overlooked and underappreciated. We present findings from comprehensive, systematic literature reviews, and new analyses of published and unpublished data, to establish the effect of stillbirth on parents, families, health-care providers, and societies worldwide. Data for direct costs of this event are sparse but suggest that a stillbirth needs more resources than a livebirth, both in the perinatal period and in additional surveillance during subsequent pregnancies. Indirect and intangible costs of stillbirth are (...) extensive and are usually met by families alone. This issue is particularly onerous for those with few resources. Negative effects, particularly on parental mental health, might be moderated by empathic attitudes of care providers and tailored interventions. The value of the baby, as well as the associated costs for parents, families, care providers, communities, and society, should be considered to prevent stillbirths and reduce associated morbidity. (shrink)

Biological ontologies are used to organize, curate, and interpret the vast quantities of data arising from biological experiments. While this works well when using a single ontology, integrating multiple ontologies can be problematic, as they are developed independently, which can lead to incompatibilities. The Open Biological and Biomedical Ontologies Foundry was created to address this by facilitating the development, harmonization, application, and sharing of ontologies, guided by a set of overarching principles. One challenge in reaching these goals was that the (...) OBO principles were not originally encoded in a precise fashion, and interpretation was subjective. Here we show how we have addressed this by formally encoding the OBO principles as operational rules and implementing a suite of automated validation checks and a dashboard for objectively evaluating each ontology’s compliance with each principle. This entailed a substantial effort to curate metadata across all ontologies and to coordinate with individual stakeholders. We have applied these checks across the full OBO suite of ontologies, revealing areas where individual ontologies require changes to conform to our principles. Our work demonstrates how a sizable federated community can be organized and evaluated on objective criteria that help improve overall quality and interoperability, which is vital for the sustenance of the OBO project and towards the overall goals of making data FAIR. Competing Interest StatementThe authors have declared no competing interest. (shrink)

CRZ: Critical Rationalist Zoology Critical rationalism should be the epistemology of zoology because criterion par falsifiability conducts scientific method. Critical rationalism trumps skeptical empiricism because the former better fits the scientific method. Skeptical empiricism excessively abandons rationalism, relying too heavily on senses, thus allowing contradictions. Deductive reasoning, the law of identity, and Occram's Razor all are key. Perhaps cryptozoology is a philosophy NOT a pseudoscience. "The Modeling Differential Equations: (P)' =~S. A derivative of philosophy is approximately science. (S)' =~E.

Abstract In this essay, O. Gabovich and V. Kuznetsov explore the issue of values and assessments through the lens of the polysystemic composition of domain-specific scientific theories—such as Newtonian celestial mechanics, classical theory of the electromagnetic field, quantum electrodynamics, and quantum chromodynamics. Each of the theory's 16 homogeneous subsystems comprises a set of relevant components, including ontic presuppositions about the studied entities and their attributes, abstract models of these entities, languages, problems, operations, etc. Scientific values are essential for both the (...) emergence and understanding of relationships, both between the components of a theory and between these and the non-theoretical aspects of science, such as individual researchers and their communities, informational, financial, and material resources, organizational structures like academies and universities, state authorities, political parties, social classes, and others. Theoretical assessments are regarded as properties of these relationships, expressed through specific non-dichotomous quantitative and qualitative value scales. The assessments used by scientists to resolve new problems within the framework of existing theories are highlighted as factors influencing their evolution. -/- Keywords: Domain-Specific Theory, Theory as a Polysystem, Meanings of the Term Value, Theory as a Tool for Producing New Knowledge, Range of Theoretical Assessments -/- Table of Contents Introduction Structural Subsystems of Scientific Theory as a Polysystem Epistemic Virtues and Values Origin and Ambiguity of the Terms “Value” and “Assessment” Axiology or Axiologies Reflections on the Sphere of Axiology Types of Values Science as a Value and Its Internal Values That Facilitate the Value of Science Value Dimensions of Science The Theory as a Foundation of New Knowledge Generation General Overview and Types of Scientific Assessments Polysemy of the Term “Assessment” General Symbolization of Binary Relations between Types of Scientific Components Certain Assessment Specifications of Relations between Types of Scientific Components Assessment of Student Knowledge and the Main Assessment (i.e., Novelty) of the Scientific Research Assessments Employed by Scientists When Addressing Problems within Existing Theories Examples of Assessments in the Subsystem of Scientific Knowledge Evaluation Example of the Maxim: “If you want to survive, change” Conclusions . (shrink)

The document proposes a normative and methodological program for reviewing poetry grounded in the Philosophy of Reality and its Basic Method. Its central claim is that a poetic work should be treated as the “reality of the poem”—the unity of the text (the objective side) and the “inner object” produced by the text in the reader (the subjective side). A competent review, therefore, must explicitly show their mutual transition and mutual verification. As an ontological axis of reading, the document introduces (...) the pair “existence ↔ essence”, where existence denotes the poem’s structural–linguistic givenness, while essence denotes its meaning-and-experience unfolding in consciousness. -/- The practical section formulates prohibitions (do not replace form with impression, or impression with form; avoid one-sidedness) and presents an A–E protocol: (A) distinguishing the sides; (B) constructing transitions (the mechanism “device/technique → effect” and the reverse reading “effect/meaning → device”); (C) intersubjective verification; (D) marking the epistemic status of conclusions (opinion → assumption → conviction → truth); (E) a criterion for “stopping the method.” It also introduces quality criteria for a philosophical review (the completeness and evidential strength of the mutual transition), a glossary of key terms (the review’s two-sided truth, the “living concept,” the “neural bridge”), and an ethics of criticism understood as responsibility for the demonstrability of one’s judgments. -/- The second part—an analytical commentary—interprets the manifesto as a transfer of the method into the humanities. It compares the approach with traditions of formalism, linguistic poetics, phenomenology/reception aesthetics, and hermeneutics; highlights strengths (disciplining experience without banning it; focus on the mechanism of understanding; an epistemic “scale of confidence”); and notes vulnerabilities (the limits of “objectivity” in poetry, the difficulty of intersubjective validation, the risk of neuro-metaphors and implicit norm-setting of taste). The analysis concludes with proposals for operationalization: refine the language of transitions, distinguish reproducibility of effect from reproducibility of interpretation, introduce levels of the inner object, and clarify rules for upgrading the status of conclusions. (shrink)

Academics do not only teach but they also research. Research cannot be up-taken unless there is a means of dissemination. One of the ways of research report dissemination is the conference. The academic conference is an opportunity for scholars to assemble and engage in conversations that aim at improving the practice of teaching and learning. It provides a forum for the sharing of ideas and experiences that enhance education and, by extension, human life. One of the challenges that academics face (...) is rarely what to present at conferences, but how to present for impact. This paper justifies conference attendance and proposes strategies for the reengineering of conference presentations for national development. (shrink)

The Manifesto restores philosophy’s subject and truth criterion via the Basic Method of Philosophy —tuning the mutual transition of the rational-logical and sensory-emotional in thought. Reality is framed as both a quasi-object and a quasi-concept; truth is the two-sided fit of concept and phenomenon. Its ontological core is the passage “existence ↔ essence.” It codifies argument norms, introduces “living concepts,” and outlines an education-and-research program. -/- Table of contents -/-  Chapter 1. Manifesto of the Philosophy of Reality  Appendix (...) 1. What Is Reality in the Philosophy of Reality  Appendix 2. The Basic Method of Philosophy  Appendix 3. A Comprehensive Analysis of the Book The Basic Method of Philosophy . (shrink)

Achieving space domain awareness requires the identification, characterization, and tracking of space objects. Storing and leveraging associated space object data for purposes such as hostile threat assessment, object identification, and collision prediction and avoidance present further challenges. Space objects are characterized according to a variety of parameters including their identifiers, design specifications, components, subsystems, capabilities, vulnerabilities, origins, missions, orbital elements, patterns of life, processes, operational statuses, and associated persons, organizations, or nations. The Space Object Ontology provides a consensus-based realist framework (...) for formulating such characterizations in a computable fashion. Space object data are aligned with classes and relations in the Space Object Ontology and stored in a dynamically updated Resource Description Framework triple store, which can be queried to support space domain awareness and the needs of spacecraft operators. This paper presents the core of the Space Object Ontology, discusses its advantages over other approaches to space object classification, and demonstrates its ability to combine diverse sets of data from multiple sources within an expandable framework. Finally, we show how the ontology provides benefits for enhancing and maintaining longterm space domain awareness. (shrink)

Achieving space situational awareness requires, at a minimum, the identification, characterization, and tracking of space objects. Leveraging the resultant space object data for purposes such as hostile threat assessment, object identification, and conjunction assessment presents major challenges. This is in part because in characterizing space objects we reference a variety of identifiers, components, subsystems, capabilities, vulnerabilities, origins, missions, orbital elements, patterns of life, operational processes, operational statuses, and so forth, which tend to be defined in highly heterogeneous and sometimes inconsistent (...) ways. The Space Domain Ontologies are designed to provide a consensus-based realist framework for formulating such characterizations in a way that is both consistent and computable. Space object data are aligned with classes and relations in a suite of ontologies built around the existing Space Object Ontology. They are stored in a dynamically updated Resource Description Framework triple store, which can be queried to support space situational awareness and the needs of spacecraft operators and analysts. This paper provides an overview of the Space Domain Ontologies and their development and use. It presents the motivation for and advantages of the Space Domain Ontologies, including the benefits they provide for enhancing and maintaining long-term space situational awareness. (shrink)

We have begun work on two separate but related ontologies for the study of neurological diseases. The first, the Neurological Disease Ontology (ND), is intended to provide a set of controlled, logically connected classes to describe the range of neurological diseases and their associated signs and symptoms, assessments, diagnoses, and interventions that are encountered in the course of clinical practice. ND is built as an extension of the Ontology for General Medical Sciences — a high-level candidate OBO Foundry ontology that (...) provides a set of general classes that can be used to describe general aspects of medical science. ND is being built with classes utilizing both textual and axiomatized definitions that describe and formalize the relations between instances of other classes within the ontology itself as well as to external ontologies such as the Gene Ontology, Cell Ontology, Protein Ontology, and Chemical Entities of Biological Interest. In addition, references to similar or associated terms in external ontologies, vocabularies and terminologies are included when possible. Initial work on ND is focused on the areas of Alzheimer’s and other diseases associated with dementia, multiple sclerosis, and stroke and cerebrovascular disease. Extensions to additional groups of neurological diseases are planned. The second ontology, the Neuro-Psychological Testing Ontology (NPT), is intended to provide a set of classes for the annotation of neuropsychological testing data. The intention of this ontology is to allow for the integration of results from a variety of neuropsychological tests that assay similar measures of cognitive functioning. Neuro-psychological testing is an important component in developing the clinical picture used in the diagnosis of patients with a range of neurological diseases, such as Alzheimer’s disease and multiple sclerosis, and following stroke or traumatic brain injury. NPT is being developed as an extension to the Ontology for Biomedical Investigations. (shrink)

Louis Loeb has identified a “nasty problem” in connection with Hume’s theory of meaning. The problem is that Hume seemingly claims we lack ideas corresponding to key metaphysical terms, such as terms like “substance” and “necessary connection,” but he then proceeds to explain why philosophers believe in the existence of entities denoted by such terms. In short, Hume seems motivated to explain belief in the existence of certain entities, despite his claiming we have no ideas corresponding to them. In this (...) paper, I strive to solve the problem by noting the important role of clear and distinct perception in his thought. In particular, I argue Hume only wishes to deny that we have clear and distinct ideas of substance and necessary connection, and not that we altogether lack any idea of substance and necessary connection, traditionally conceived. (shrink)

A response to James S. Spiegel's article in THINK 43 in which he argues that same-sex marriage is unjust.

A natural reading of Hume’s distinction between impressions and ideas is that impressions are forceful perceptions whereas ideas are faint. A problem emerges, however, when Hume countenances the possibility of faint impressions and forceful ideas. In this paper, I attempt a resolution to the problem. I argue that Hume characterizes impressions and ideas intensionally and extensionally, and sometimes uses the term in only one of the two senses. I argue that Hume intensionally defines impressions and ideas as forceful perceptions and (...) weak perceptions, respectively, but takes these to be extensionally equivalent to original and copied perceptions, respectively. Hume recognizes that his two characterizations—the intensional and extensional—don’t perfectly match up, and that there are exceptions to the purported equivalences (the exceptions being disease, sleep, madness, and enthusiasm). Nonetheless, I argue that Hume’s willing to proceed with his definitions. (shrink)

Originally published in 1975, this is the concluding section of E.P. Thompson's study of the 18th century English legislation known as "the Black Act." Thompson, a Marxist historian, here embraces and defends the notion of the rule of law, famously calling it "an unqualified human good" (p. 208).

We are developing the Neurological Disease Ontology (ND) to provide a framework to enable representation of aspects of neurological diseases that are relevant to their treatment and study. ND is a representational tool that addresses the need for unambiguous annotation, storage, and retrieval of data associated with the treatment and study of neurological diseases. ND is being developed in compliance with the Open Biomedical Ontology Foundry principles and builds upon the paradigm established by the Ontology for General Medical Science (OGMS) (...) for the representation of entities in the domain of disease and medical practice. Initial applications of ND will include the annotation and analysis of large data sets and patient records for Alzheimer’s disease, multiple sclerosis, and stroke. (shrink)

A type of argument occasionally made in metaethics, epistemology and philosophy of science notes that most ordinary uses of some expression fail to satisfy the strictest interpretation of the expression, and concludes that the ordinary assertions are false. This requires there to be a presumption in favour of a strict interpretation of expressions that admit of interpretations at different levels of strictness. We argue that this presumption is unmotivated, and thus the arguments fail.

The Neurological Disease Ontology (ND) is being developed to provide a comprehensive framework for the representation of neurological diseases (Diehl et al., 2013). ND utilizes the model established by the Ontology for General Medical Science (OGMS) for the representation of entities in medicine and disease (Scheuermann et al., 2009). The goal of ND is to include information for each disease concerning its molecular, genetic, and environmental origins, the processes involved in its etiology and realization, as well as its clinical presentation (...) including signs and symptoms. (shrink)

Variable selection poses a significant challenge in causal modeling, particularly within the social sciences, where constructs often rely on interrelated factors such as age, socioeconomic status, gender, and race. Indeed, it has been argued that such attributes must be modeled as macro-level abstractions of lower-level manipulable features, in order to preserve the modularity assumption essential to causal inference (Mossé ́e et al., 2025). This paper accordingly extends the theoretical framework of Causal Feature Learning (CFL). Empirically, we apply the CFL algorithm (...) to diverse social science datasets, evaluating how CFL-derived macrostates compare with traditional microstates in downstream modeling tasks. (shrink)

Hyperlogic is a hyperintensional system designed to regiment metalogical claims (e.g., “Intuitionistic logic is correct” or “The law of excluded middle holds”) into the object language, including within embedded environments such as attitude reports and counterfactuals. This paper is the first of a two-part series exploring the logic of hyperlogic. This part presents a minimal logic of hyperlogic and proves its completeness. It consists of two interdefined axiomatic systems: one for classical consequence (truth preservation under a classical interpretation of the (...) connectives) and one for “universal” consequence (truth preservation under any interpretation). The sequel to this paper explores stronger logics that are sound and complete over various restricted classes of models as well as languages with hyperintensional operators. (shrink)

The emphasis in contemporary democratic theory and in the history of political thought on the peculiarly abstract theory of popular sovereignty of Locke and his twentieth-century intellectual descendants obscures a crucial relationship between constitutional self-government and nationalism. Through a Hobbesian and Filmerian critique of Locke and an examination of the political writings of George Lawson, the article shows the necessary connections between popular sovereignty, constitutionalism and a form of national consciousness that renders concrete the otherwise abstract and airy notion of (...) the pre-political community to which government is to be held accountable, and, through amyth of national origin, memories of native traditions of self-government, and stories of heroic ancestors who successfully defended those traditions against usurpers and tyrants, gives substance to theories of constitutional government. (shrink)

The recent literature abounds with accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of so-called predicates of personal taste, i.e. predicates whose application is, in some sense or other, a subjective matter. Relativism and contextualism are the major types of theories. One crucial difference between these theories concerns how we should assess previous taste claims. Relativism predicts that we should assess them in the light of the taste standard governing the context of assessment. Contextualism predicts that we should assess them in the (...) light of the taste standard governing the context of use. We show in a range of experiments that neither prediction is correct. People have no clear preferences either way and which taste standard they choose in evaluating a previous taste claim crucially depends on whether they start out with a favorable attitude towards the object in question and then come to have an unfavorable attitude or vice versa. We suggest an account of the data in terms of what we call hybrid relativism. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of the phrase ‘acting on behalf of another.’ To do this, acting on behalf is first distinguished from ‘acting for the sake of another,’ the latter being a matter of other-directed motivation, the former of what we call ‘normative other-directedness’—i.e., acting on the claims and duties of the other. Second, we provide a distinction between two kinds of acting on behalf of another: representation as other-directedness plus normative replacement, and normative support as other-directedness without normative (...) replacement. Third, the paper offers conditions of appropriateness for both types of acting on behalf. (shrink)

-/- Here’s a DARPA-style Heilmeier Catechism for the work you linked: -/- Heilmeier Catechism for Blueprint for a Quantum Entropy Reversal Device to Test Theories of Posthumous Apotheosis and Afterlife Dynamics by Alexander Ohnemus (forthcoming) 1) What are you trying to do? To design a hypothetical experimental device—a Quantum Entropy Reversal Simulator (QERS)—that would empirically test and potentially falsify philosophical and speculative theories about universal posthumous apotheosis, entropy reversal, and the persistence of consciousness after death. In plain language: Create (...) a blueprint for an apparatus that can simulate death-like conditions, attempt localized entropy reversal, and measure any signals suggestive of post-death consciousness or “divine ascension.” -/- 2) How is it done today, and what are the limits of current practice? Currently there is no accepted scientific method or technology capable of reversing entropy or measuring consciousness after biological death in a controlled experiment. Traditional neuroscience, quantum physics, and thermodynamics do not provide mechanisms for testing posthumous apotheosis. All empirical work on consciousness occurs in living subjects; afterlife questions remain philosophical or theological. Limits: Entropy in physics is statistically irreversible. -/- Consciousness outside a living system lacks measurable correlates. -/- No reproducible experimental protocols exist for simulating after-death states. -/- 3) What’s new in your approach and why do you think it will be successful? This approach proposes integrating speculative concepts from quantum theory, brain-computer interfacing, and consciousness research (e.g., “Gateway Process”) into a concrete experimental framework. Although highly unconventional, it attempts to move afterlife speculation into a testable architecture, not merely philosophical discourse. Why potentially successful: It reframes metaphysical claims into measurable proxies (entropy metrics, signal detection). -/- It leverages interdisciplinary tools from quantum computing and neuroscience to build a falsifiable design. -/- 4) What are the key metrics for success? Success would be evaluated on multiple levels: Design feasibility: a physically consistent and technically detailed blueprint. -/- Simulable model: ability to run simplified simulations of the QERS under known physical laws. -/- Measurable outputs: defined signals or data that the device would capture under test conditions. -/- Falsifiability criteria: explicit conditions under which key theories (e.g., posthumous apotheosis) would be ruled out by null results. -/- 5) What are the risks and how could they be mitigated? Risks: Theoretical: Entropy reversal contradicts well-established thermodynamics. -/- Experimental: Lack of established means to induce or measure “afterlife signals.” -/- Interpretive: Even if unusual data emerge, attributing it to consciousness or “apotheosis” may be contested. -/- Mitigations: Grounding the design in clearly articulated physical assumptions. -/- Building modular experiments where individual components can be tested independently (e.g., brain-computer interface validation). -/- Defining conservative null hypotheses and statistical controls. -/- 6) How long will it take and what are the major milestones? A rough staged roadmap might look like: Months 0–6: Formalize theoretical framework; identify measurable variables. -/- Months 6–12: Design modular subsystems (simulation models, sensor interfaces). -/- Months 12–24: Prototype testing of individual modules (e.g., entropy metric sensor). -/- Months 24–36: Fully integrated simulation tests; data collection protocols. -/- Months 36+: Comparative analysis to falsify or refine target theories. -/- 7) What will it cost? This is speculative but could be budgeted in phases: Phase I (Concept & Simulation): low cost; mainly theoretical and computational. -/- Phase II (Subsystem Prototypes): moderate; involves lab work and specialized hardware. -/- Phase III (Integrated System): high; quantum computing resources and advanced sensors. -/- 8) What are the risks if you fail? Failure to detect meaningful signals would not validate posthumous apotheosis; rather, it would provide empirical evidence against specific philosophical claims, tightening the boundary between speculative and testable theories. It would also yield insights into the limits of interdisciplinary experimental philosophy and clarify where empirical science can—and cannot—address metaphysical questions. -/- If you want, I can also help reformulate this into a project proposal outline or academic abstract in a more conventional style. (shrink)

Verteilungsgerechtigkeit befasst sich mit der Verteilung von Gütern innerhalb einer Gruppe, wobei verschiedene Verteilungsprinzipien und -ergebnisse als mögliche Ideale einer solchen Verteilung verhandelt werden. Diese normativen Ansätze sind oft rein verbal formuliert, wodurch ihre Anwendung auf unterschiedliche konkrete Verteilungssituationen, die hinsichtlich ihrer Gerechtigkeit beurteilt werden sollen, häufig schwer fällt. Eine Möglichkeit, fein abgestufte Gerechtigkeitsbeurteilungen verschiedener Verteilungen präzise erfassen zu können, besteht in der formalen Modellierung solcher Ideale durch Maße oder Indizes. Die Auswahl eines geeigneten Maßes, das ein gewisses Ideal abbilden (...) soll, muss ihrerseits eine Fundierung erfahren, was durch die Forderung von begründeten Axiomen erreicht werden kann, denen ein Maß genügen soll. In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden solche Axiome für Maße der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit am Beispiel von Bedarfsgerechtigkeit eingeführt. Ferner werden exemplarische Maße der Bedarfsgerechtigkeit vorgestellt. Damit wird für die Beurteilung und Modellierung von Maßen der Verteilungsgerechtigkeit eine erste diskutable Grundlage gelegt. (shrink)

It is widely held that counterfactuals, unlike attitude ascriptions, preserve the referential transparency of their constituents, i.e., that counterfactuals validate the substitution of identicals when their constituents do. The only putative counterexamples in the literature come from counterpossibles, i.e., counterfactuals with impossible antecedents. Advocates of counterpossibilism, i.e., the view that counterpossibles are not all vacuous, argue that counterpossibles can generate referential opacity. But in order to explain why most substitution inferences into counterfactuals seem valid, counterpossibilists also often maintain that counterfactuals (...) with possible antecedents are transparency‐preserving. I argue that if counterpossibles can generate opacity, then so can ordinary counterfactuals with possible antecedents. Utilizing an analogy between counterfactuals and attitude ascriptions, I provide a counterpossibilist‐friendly explanation for the apparent validity of substitution inferences into counterfactuals. I conclude by suggesting that the debate over counterpossibles is closely tied to questions concerning the extent to which counterfactuals are more like attitude ascriptions and epistemic operators than previously recognized. (shrink)

This paper argues that higher-order doubt generates an epistemic dilemma. One has a higher-order doubt with regards to P insofar as one justifiably withholds belief as to what attitude towards P is justified. That is, one justifiably withholds belief as to whether one is justified in believing, disbelieving, or withholding belief in P. Using the resources provided by Richard Feldman’s recent discussion of how to respect one’s evidence, I argue that if one has a higher-order doubt with regards to P, (...) then one is not justified in having any attitude towards P. Otherwise put: No attitude towards the doubted proposition respects one’s higher-order doubt. I argue that the most promising response to this problem is to hold that when one has a higher-order doubt about P, the best one can do to respect such a doubt is to simply have no attitude towards P. Higher-order doubt is thus much more rationally corrosive than non-higher-order doubt, as it undermines the possibility of justifiably having any attitude towards the doubted proposition. (shrink)

It is important to note that certain mental health disorders are classified as rare conditions, and they have their own ‘cultural concepts of distress’ as defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM 5). Cultural concepts of distress are a recent attempt to understand psychological distress influenced by culture, separate from biomedical diagnoses that require equal attention and support for individuals and their families, both physically and emotionally. [1].

We propose a structuralist reconstruction of the real continuum, arguing that it is not a primitive ontological stage for physics but an emergent completion of the prime-exponent lattice M. By identifying the reals R as the Dedekind completion of M, we demonstrate that the natural logarithm and exponential functions are not merely analytic tools but inevitable algebraic consequences of identifying the multiplicative structure of number theory with the additive structure of the continuum. Furthermore, we show that the natural base e (...) is the unique structural invariant required to normalize the gauge freedom inherent in this identification. Finally, we refine the Erdős–Kac theorem to argue that the "Triple-Log" scale (ln ln ln n) emerges as a deterministic background limit of arithmetic, providing an intrinsic argument for a natural ultraviolet cutoff in physical theories without external imposition. In the language of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), this framework suggests that the 'physical continuum' is not an object-like substance, but a structural instantiation of the relation between the additive and multiplicative sectors of arithmetic. (shrink)

One might think that its seeming to you that p makes you justified in believing that p. After all, when you have no defeating beliefs, it would be irrational to have it seem to you that p but not believe it. That view is plausible for perceptual justification, problematic in the case of memory, and clearly wrong for inferential justification. I propose a view of rationality and justified belief that deals happily with inference and memory. Appearances are to be evaluated (...) as ‘sound’ or ‘unsound.’ Only a sound appearance can give rise to a justified belief, yet even an unsound appearance can ‘rationally require’ the subject to form the belief. Some of our intuitions mistake that rational requirement for the belief’s being justified. The resulting picture makes it plausible that there are also unsound perceptual appearances. I suggest that to have a sound perceptually basic appearance that p, one must see that p. (shrink)

This paper explains what’s wrong with a Hume-inspired argument for skepticism about induction. Hume’s argument takes as a premise that inductive reasoning presupposes that the future will resemble the past. I explain why that claim is not plausible. The most plausible premise in the vicinity is that inductive reasoning from E to H presupposes that if E then H. I formulate and then refute a skeptical argument based on that premise. Central to my response is a psychological explanation for how (...) people judge that if E then H without realizing that they thereby settled the matter rationally. (shrink)

Sentences about logic are often used to show that certain embedding expressions, including attitude verbs, conditionals, and epistemic modals, are hyperintensional. Yet it not clear how to regiment “logic talk” in the object language so that it can be compositionally embedded under such expressions. This paper does two things. First, it argues against a standard account of logic talk, viz., the impossible worlds semantics. It is shown that this semantics does not easily extend to a language with propositional quantifiers, which (...) are necessary for regimenting some logic talk. Second, it develops an alternative framework based on logical expressivism, which explains logic talk using shifting conventions. When combined with the standard S5π+ semantics for propositional quantifiers, this framework results in a well-behaved system that does not face the problems of the impossible worlds semantics. It can also be naturally extended with hybrid operators to regiment a broader range of logic talk, e.g., claims about what laws hold according to other logics. The resulting system, called hyperlogic, is therefore a better framework for modeling logic talk than previous accounts. (shrink)

It is shown that one common formulation of Stalnaker's semantics for conditionals is incomplete: it has no sound and (strongly) complete proof system. At first, this seems to conflict with well-known completeness results for this semantics (e.g., Stalnaker and Thomason 1967; Stalnaker 1970 and Lewis 1973, ch. 6). As it turns out, it does not: these completeness results rely on another closely-related formulation of the semantics that is provably complete. Specifically, the difference comes down to how the Limit Assumption is (...) stated. I close with some remarks about what this means for the logic of conditionals. (shrink)

Many of my first students at Anzaldúa’s alma mater read Borderlands/La Frontera and concluded that Anzaldúa was not a philosopher. Hostile comments suggested that Anzaldúa’s intimately personal and poetic ways of writing were not philosophical. In response, I created “American Philosophy and Self-Culture” using backwards course design and taught variations of it in 2013, 2016, and 2018. Students spend nearly a month exploring Anzaldúa’s works, but only after reading three centuries of U.S.-American philosophers who wrote in deeply personal and literary (...) ways about self-transformation, community-building, and world-changing. The sections of this chapter: 1) describe why my first students rejected Anzaldúa as a philosopher in terms of the discipline’s parochialism; 2) present Anzaldúa’s broader understanding of herself as a philosopher; 3) summarize my reconstructed Anzaldúa-inspired American Philosophy course and outline some assignments; 4) discuss how my students respond to Borderlands/La Frontera when we read it through the lens of self-culture; and 5) explain my attempt to shape the subdiscipline of American Philosophy by teaching Anzaldúa to specialists at the 2017 Summer Institute in American Philosophy. (shrink)

Mark Jago has presented a dilemma for truthmaker non-maximalism—the thesis that some but not all truths require truthmakers. The dilemma arises because some truths that do not require truthmakers by the non-maximalist’s lights (e.g., that Santa Claus does not exist) are necessitated by truths that do (e.g., that Barack Obama knows that Santa Claus does not exist). According to Jago, the non-maximalist can supply a truthmaker for such a truth only by conceding the primary motivation for the view: that it (...) allows one to avoid positing strange ‘negative’ entities without adopting a non-standard account of the necessary features of ordinary things. In this paper, I sketch out and defend two plausible non-maximalist proposals that evade Jago’s dilemma. (shrink)

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel states unequivocally that the category of “life” is a strictly logical, or pure, form of thinking. His treatment of actual life – i.e., that which empirically constitutes nature – arises first in his *Philosophy of Nature* when the logic is applied under the conditions of space and time. Nevertheless, many commentators find Hegel’s development of this category as a purely logical one especially difficult to accept. Indeed, they find this development only comprehensible as long (...) as one simultaneously assumes that Hegel breaks his promise to let the logic do the leading. However, if Hegel were to in fact allow the logical development to be led by biological analogies at this point, problems would ensue. Not only would it contradict his own speculative method, which should secure the necessity of the categories, but it would also endanger the ontological generality of the category of life itself. Beyond undermining his method and the logical integrity of the category, however, I will argue that such a reading makes the transition to the next category of “cognition” unintelligible and problematic. My aim in the first part of this paper is to argue how logical life can be read as a pure category. I then argue in the second part how my reconstruction makes the transition to cognition intelligible without resorting to profane or supernatural interpretations. (shrink)

For more than one decade, Andy Clark has defended the now-famous extended mind thesis, the idea that cognitive processes leak into the world. In this paper I analyse Clark’s theoretical justification for the thesis: explanatory simplicity. I argue that his way of justifying the thesis leads into contradiction, either at the level of propositional attitude ascriptions or at the theoretical level. I evaluate three possible strategies of dealing with this issue, concluding that they are all likely to fail and that (...) therefore, as regards explanatory simplicity, the burden of proof is on Clark’s side. The paper divides into two main sections: in “Simplicity and Coherence”, I define the two concepts that are important in this context (simplicity and explanatory coherence). In “How to Cope with Coherence”, these two concepts are applied to the central thought experiment, the Inga/Otto case. It will be shown that justifying the extended mind thesis by reference to simplicity may cause trouble, because ‘extended’ behavioural descriptions are likely to yield rather complicated explanations. (shrink)

Causal Bayes nets (CBNs) provide one of the most powerful tools for modelling coarse-grained type-level causal structure. As in other fields (e.g., thermodynamics) the question arises how such coarse-grained characterisations are related to the characterisation of their underlying structure (in this case: token-level causal relations). Answering this question meets what is called a “coherence-requirement” in the reduction debate: How are different accounts of one and the same system (or kind of system) related to each other. We argue that CBNs as (...) tools for type-level causal inference are abstract enough to roughly fit any current token-level theory of causation as long as certain modelling assumptions are satisfied, but accounts of actual causation, i.e. accounts that attempt to infer token-causation based on CBNs, for the very same reason, face certain limitations. (shrink)

We present a game mechanic called pseudo-visibility for games inhabited by non-player characters (NPCs) driven by reinforcement learning (RL). NPCs are incentivized to pretend they cannot see pseudo-visible players: the training environment simulates an NPC to determine how the NPC would act if the pseudo-visible player were invisible, and penalizes the NPC for acting differently. NPCs are thereby trained to selectively ignore pseudo-visible players, except when they judge that the reaction penalty is an acceptable tradeoff (e.g., a guard might accept (...) the penalty in order to protect a treasure because losing the treasure would hurt even more). We describe an RL agent transformation which allows RL agents that would not otherwise do so to perform some limited self-reflection to learn the training environments in question. (shrink)

This paper presents a novel understanding of the notion of calculability. In Gricean frameworks, calculability is defined in terms of how speakers can infer an implicature. The relevant inferences must e.g. be based on maxims of conversation or cooperation principles. Meanwhile, I suggest to define calculability in terms of when, or under which conditions, speakers can infer an implicature. An implicature is calculable if hearers can infer its existence even supposing that the implicature is not semantically encoded. This approach avoids (...) familiar challenges, including recently prominent challenges from pragmatic particularism. (shrink)

The original blueprint outlines a speculative, interdisciplinary system for a "Participatory Time Machine" that enables backward time travel to parallel universes without violating causality or thermodynamics. It integrates concepts from quantum mechanics, neuroscience, AI, and cosmology. To make this more actionable for engineers, I've restructured it into concrete engineering tasks, specifications, prototyping steps, and implementation guidelines. This focuses on modular development, using existing technologies where possible (e.g., Neuralink-style BCIs, IBM or Google quantum processors, and Grok-like AI models), while highlighting feasibility (...) gaps in speculative elements like entropy reversal or dimensional branching. Assume a cross-functional team (hardware, software, quantum, and neuro engineers) with a budget starting at $50-100M for prototypes. Key assumptions for actionability: • Treat time travel as a simulation-based system initially (e.g., quantum simulations of parallel timelines), scaling to "real" entanglement if proven feasible. • Prioritize safety: All prototypes include fail-safes for neural health and ethical overrides. • Use agile development: Build, test, iterate in phases, starting with non-quantum subsystems. System Architecture: Engineering Breakdown Design the system as a modular, scalable hardware-software stack. Use off-the-shelf components for rapid prototyping, custom-build for quantum integration. Total system footprint: ~10x10m shielded lab room. (shrink)

This article argues, against contemporary experimentalist criticism, that conceptual analysis has epistemic value, with a structure that encourages the development of interesting hypotheses which are of the right form to be valuable in diverse areas of philosophy. The article shows, by analysis of the Gettier programme, that conceptual analysis shares the proofs and refutations form Lakatos identified in mathematics. Upon discovery of a counterexample, this structure aids the search for a replacement hypothesis. The search is guided by heuristics. The heuristics (...) of conceptual analysis are similar to those in other interesting areas of scholarship, and so hypotheses generated by it are of the right form to be applicable to diverse areas. The article shows that the explanationist criterion in epistemology was developed and applied in this way. The epistemic value of conceptual analysis is oblique because it contributes not towards the main purpose of conceptual analysis but towards the reliable development of epistemically valuable hypotheses in philosophy and scholarship. (shrink)

Background: Many people with aphasia and people without brain injury talk to themselves in their heads, i.e., have “inner speech.” Inner speech may be more preserved compared with spoken speech for some people with aphasia and may serve a variety of functions (e.g., emotion regulation), which motivates us to provide a high-fidelity characterization of it. Researchers have used multiple methods to measure this internal phenomenon in the past, which we combine here for the first time in a single study. Aims: (...) We compare performance between individuals with and without aphasia on inner speech tasks that assess inner speech “inthe- moment” to general subjective impressions of inner speech to tease apart the relationship of aphasia severity to inner speech. Methods and Procedures: Twenty people with mild-moderate aphasia and twenty neurotypical controls completed several inner speech tasks, including objective silent rhyme judgements (picture, written, and auditory), subjective reports of inner speech during naming, and subjective rating scales about inner speech experience more generally. Outcomes and Results: In-the-moment inner speech during silent rhyming tasks was associated with aphasia severity only for picture and written rhyming but not auditory rhyming. In-the-moment inner speech reports during silent naming were not associated with aphasia severity, nor were the subjective ratings about general inner speech experience. Individuals with and without aphasia demonstrated a variety of subjective general inner speech experiences, demonstrating heterogeneity of this phenomenon more broadly. Conclusions: Methods of measuring inner speech complement each other and speak to different facets of the inner speech phenomenon, and clinicians and researchers must carefully choose the method(s) that will provide the information about inner speech that they desire. (shrink)

The Common Core Ontologies(CCO) are designed as a mid-level ontology suite that extends the Basic Formal Ontology. In 2017,CUBRC, Inc. made CCO openly available. CCO has since been increasingly adopted by a broad group of users and applications and is proposed as the first standard mid-level ontology. Despite these successes, documentation of the contents and design patterns of the CCO has been comparatively minimal. This paper is a step toward providing enhanced documentation for the mid-level ontology suite through a discussion (...) of the contents of the eleven ontologies that collectively comprise the Common Core Ontology suite. (shrink)

There is an important sense in which one can be sure without being certain, i.e., without assigning unit probability. I will offer an explication of this sense of sureness, connecting it with the level of credence that a rational agent would need to have to be confident that she won’t ever lose her confidence. A simple formal result then gives us an explicit formula connecting the threshold α for credence needed for confidence with the threshold needed for being sure: one (...) needs 1−(1−α) to be sure. I then suggest that stepping between α and 1−(1−α) gives a procedure that generates an interesting hierarchy of credential thresholds. (shrink)

Recent literature has raised what I'll call the 'multiscale argument' against reduction (see e.g. Batterman (2013), Wilson (2017), Bursten (2018)). These authors observe that numerous successful scientific models appeal to features and properties from a wide range of spatial/temporal scales. This is taken to undermine views that the world is sharply divided into distinct levels, roughly corresponding to different scales, and that each higher level is reducible to the next lowest level. -/- While the multiscale argument does undermine a naive (...) conception of levels and reduction, in this paper I argue that alternative views of reduction and levels can withstand this argument. After articulating the multiscale argument in more detail, I show that this does not undermine a version of reduction that accepts methodological pluralism in science, yet maintains that the adequacy of any model can be explained by appeal to details at smaller scales. I go on to discuss a case study – dislocations in steel –e used by Batterman and Wilson in defence of the multiscale argument. I argue that the version of reduction advocated above is available in this context. I conclude by arguing that, in the face of the multiscale argument, levels are either everywhere or nowhere. (shrink)

Joint attention is a social-cognitive phenomenon in which two or more agents direct their attention together towards the same object. Definitions range from this rather broad conception to more specific definitions which require that, in addition, attention be directed to the same aspect of that object and that agents need to be mutually aware of their jointly attending. Joint attention is an important coordination mechanism in joint action. The capacity for engaging in joint attention, in particular in the sense of (...) this narrower definition, is frequently taken to indicate the presence of theory of mind in the participating agents, and is also implicated in the development of theory of mind. However, the prominence of sensorimotor components in establishing and sustaining episodes of joint attention — e.g., eye and head movements, pointing and vocalizations — suggests that sensorimotor approaches to social interaction may be well-placed to account for important parts of joint attention without invoking theory-of-mind abilities, and may therefore provide a valuable alternative to approaches emphasizing theory of mind. In particular, sensorimotor accounts may explain aspects of joint attention through the dynamics and regularities in the sensorimotor processes that coordinate the activities of the agents. (shrink)